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 Abstract  This chapter outlines a way to foster science-based entrepreneurship and 
to develop some of the promising discoveries made jointly by Japanese universities 
and corporate researchers. The core proposal is to encourage the formation of inde-
pendent, venture-capital-backed spin-offs based upon technologies jointly discov-
ered by universities and companies that are lying dormant, but that have signi fi cant 
commercial potential. This chapter outlines the rationale for this proposal and a 
process for doing so. It discusses one spin-off that appears to be successful so far—
TeraView—spun off from Toshiba Research Europe and the Cavendish Laboratory 
of the University of Cambridge, as well as barriers to replicating this promising 
example. Ultimately, the success of this endeavor will depend upon established 
Japanese companies and university researchers both realizing that they stand to 
bene fi t. Success also depends upon altering longstanding practices in some indus-
tries related to intellectual property (IP) management, particularly the cross-sharing 
of IP rights and the reluctance to exclusively out-license technologies. 
 1  First Rationale: New Companies Are Important 
for Innovation 
 New companies (i.e., startups or venture companies) have proved to be superior 
compared to established companies in developing many innovative technologies, 
provided they can grow in an environment that is supportive of science-based 
entrepreneurship. 
 This is clear in the case of pharmaceuticals. A review of all the new drugs approved 
by the United States Food and Drug Administration between 1998–2007 clearly shows 
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that new companies (biotechs) are much more likely than established pharmaceutical 
companies to undertake the initial development of innovative drugs—in other words, 
drugs that have a new physiological mechanism of action or new chemical structure, or 
drugs that offer signi fi cant health bene fi ts over existing drugs  [ 1 ] . This is especially true 
in the case of orphan drugs (which usually have small markets), biologics (complex 
protein drugs whose discovery is not amenable to mass screening techniques), and drugs 
discovered in universities. Indeed, it is extremely rare for pharmaceutical companies to 
undertake initial development of groundbreaking drugs discovered in universities. 
Instead, since about 1980 the world has relied upon new companies to undertake this 
development to bring such discoveries closer to public bene fi t. 
 Similarly, new companies are leaders in  fi elds such as robotic surgery, gene 
sequencers, therapeutic biomedical devices, wireless medical monitoring devices, 
applications of stem cell technologies, lab-on-a-chip systems, 3-D printers, and, of 
course, Internet communications and social media. They are among the leading 
companies in industries such as vascular endoscopes, semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment, high ef fi ciency solar cells, microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) 
sensors for high-stress environments, and wave energy power generation. 
 In Japan, one often hears the mantra that new companies cannot succeed in  industries 
with high capital or manufacturing costs or where large companies are active  [ 2 ] . Yet 
this common belief is belied by the semiconductor companies that rose to prominence 
in the 1980s, such as LSI Logic, VLSI Technology, Cypress Semiconductor, and 
Cisco Systems  [ 3 ] , and also by the companies that pioneered small hard disk drives, 
such as Seagate, Maxtor, and Western Digital that spun off from IBM  [ 4 ] . The ability 
of new companies to succeed with new technologies while large companies with 
much greater resources fail, depends upon the new companies’ ability to obtain large 
investments (usually from private venture capital), to protect their discoveries with 
patents and copyrights, and to outsource manufacturing. But their success is also often 
a result of large companies not perceiving the value of new technologies, considering 
the market for them to be too small, considering new technologies to be too removed 
from the needs of their main customers, and simply being too bureaucratic to develop 
them rapidly  [ 4– 6 ] . Henderson  [ 7 ] suggests that, considering the internal competence 
of large  fi rms and the way they are geared to meeting the needs of current customers, 
it may be rational for them to ignore innovative discoveries. This may be particularly 
true if they can outsource the risky development of innovative technologies to start-
ups, on the assumption that they can buy the startups or partner with them, once the 
startups have shown proof of concept  [ 1,  8 ] . 
 2  Second Rationale: Barriers to Science-Based 
Entrepreneurship in Japan 
 In almost all the examples cited above of industries where startups are leaders, most 
of the leading startups are based in the United States. However, the pharmaceutical 
data show that not only America, but also Canada, Australia, Israel, and to a lesser 
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extent, the United Kingdom, are countries where startups are lead innovators  [ 1 ] . 
The patterns of pharmaceutical innovation for Japan and continental Europe, in par-
ticular Japan and Germany, are very similar. There, new drug discoveries occur 
almost exclusively in the in-house laboratories of established companies, and these 
drugs are generally not innovative. 
 There are some signs of startups playing a larger role in Japanese innovation. 
The number of Japanese biomedical therapies being developed by startups has 
increased. In 2004, about 135 Japanese biotechs were developing new medical ther-
apies but only about  fi ve had new drugs (or other therapies) on the market or in 
clinical trials. Five years later in 2009, the number of therapeutic-oriented biotechs 
had decreased slightly (to about 115). However, these had about 45 new Japan-
invented drugs, drug delivery systems, regenerative medicine therapies, or thera-
peutic vaccines on the market or in clinical trials. This is probably a higher number 
of domestic-origin therapies than from startups in any continental European country 
 [ 1 ] . Also, more recent graduates of elite Japanese universities seem to be starting 
new companies than 10 years ago  [ 9 ] . 
 However, outside of biomedicine, progress is weaker. Few new companies with 
unique technologies that have international market potential seem to be on a growth 
trajectory. Without going into details, several companies that seemed to have growth 
potential have stalled. In some cases they have been overtaken by overseas startups. 
In other cases they have been slow to seek overseas markets and have been con fi ned 
to alliances with Japanese companies. Moreover, since the 1990s, few if any spin-
offs from established companies have succeeded in becoming leaders in Japan, 
much less in the global market. However, there have been many failures, often 
related to interference from the parents  [ 6 ] . 
 Numerous interrelated and complex factors make the environment for science-
based entrepreneurship less supportive than in North America or Australia. Many of 
these are related to deeply rooted social and institutional factors of the type that 
distinguish liberal market economies (including the United States, Canada, and 
Australia) from coordinated market economies, such as Japan and continental 
Europe. 1 A possible list might be as follows 2 :
 1  Exactly in line with the pharmaceutical data above,  liberal market economies are said to 
produce relatively more radical innovations while  coordinated market economies tend to excel 
in incremental innovations. The greater propensity for new companies to undertake radical 
innovation, and the relatively more supportive environments for science-based entrepreneur-
ship in liberal market as opposed to coordinated market economies, may be the missing link 
explaining this phenomenon. Liberal market economies are characterized by relatively high 
labor mobility, low job security, low reliance on in-house training, minimal government and 
organized labor involvement in business decisions, and a tendency for equity as opposed to 
loan  fi nancing for business expansion; while the opposite features characterize coordinated 
market economies  [ 10 ] . 
 2  Along with the speci fi cally cited references, see  [ 6 ] for reasons 1–7 and  [ 11 ] for reasons 8–10. 
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  1.  Low mobility for skilled professionals (hesitancy to work in startups and to 
change jobs) 
  2.  Limited access to capital, in particular few angel investors and lack of business 
and technical expertise among venture capital (VC) investors 
  3.  Preference in large companies for autarkic (self-reliant) innovation  [ 12 ] 
  4.  Tendency for Japanese startups to focus on the domestic markets and alliances and 
to ignore more competitive but more rewarding overseas opportunities—a ten-
dency reinforced by language barriers and the dearth of personnel comfortable 
dealing with overseas organizations 
  5.  Preemption of university IP and researchers’ energy by large companies  [ 13 ] 
  6.  Limited preference for small businesses in Japanese government procurement, 
and a cumbersome Japanese government equivalent to the United States’ SBIR 
program 
  7.  Japanese entrepreneurs prefer service or value-chain companies to more con-
frontational and disruptive “gazelles” 
  8.  The system of allocating government support for university R&D (i.e., the way 
research proposals are solicited and selected for funding) creates disincentives 
to pursue innovative research 
  9.  The system of patronage-based university recruitment and promotion similarly 
creates disincentives to pursue innovative university research 
 10.  Cultural and institutional barriers to horizontal, inter-organizational informa-
tion sharing and cooperation as described by Nakane  [ 14 ] 
 Among these, probably the  fi rst is the most important. The close relationship 
between a  fl uid labor market, entrepreneurship, and innovation has been 
described by Saxenian  [ 15 ] , Hyde  [ 16 ] , and Fujimoto  [ 17 ] . A  fl uid, or high 
velocity, labor market ensures that persons who join startups usually can con-
tinue their careers if their company fails. When combined with easy entry and 
exit of startups, a  fl uid labor market constantly reallocates the most precious 
resource of all—human capital—among companies where it is most needed and 
rewarded. It also creates a network where information is shared rapidly across 
organizational boundaries. It results in high dedication to work and high align-
ment of corporate and individual goals. All these factors decrease the perception 
of risk for investors contemplating investing in startups. The tendency for pro-
fessionals to spend most of their careers in one or two companies is probably 
the single most important factor underlying the similarities between Japan and 
Germany with respect to entrepreneurship and innovation. Many of the factors 
that distinguish liberal and coordinated market economies impact labor mobil-
ity (footnote 1 and Hall and Soskice 2001  [ 10 ] ). 
 The proposal at the heart of this chapter does not address labor mobility 
directly. However, if successful, it will go a long way towards creating a critical 
mass of mobile entrepreneurial scientists and managers that will address this most 
important issue. However, it does address the barriers listed above as 2, 3 and 5, 
as well as 4, provided overseas investors can be included in the spin-off process. 
In particular, barrier 5 is addressed by the following rationale for this proposal. 
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 3  Third Rationale: The Number of Dormant 
Industry–University Joint Inventions Is Large 
 Joint applications for patents covering industry–university collaborative research 
discoveries are the dominant form of technology transfer in Japan, vastly exceeding 
licenses of independently invented university discoveries. Since 2007, such joint 
applications have consistently accounted for about 60% of the approximately 9,000 
total annual university patent applications to the Japan Patent Of fi ce (JPO). Because 
only a fraction of the remaining 40% of university applications are licensed, the 
ratio of jointly patented collaborative research inventions to inventions transferred 
under independent licenses is roughly 3:1 in major universities and probably even 
higher in lesser known universities. The vast majority of the industry co-owners of 
these patents are large Japanese companies  [ 18,  19 ] . 
 At the other end of the international patent application process, patents co-owned 
by Japanese universities and private companies account for about one third of all 
United States patents covering Japanese university inventions. 3 The vast majority of 
these companies are established Japanese companies. This situation is probably 
unique among major industrialized countries. Only about 15% of German univer-
sity inventions that have been awarded United States patents are co-owned by com-
panies. For Canadian and United Kingdom university inventions, the proportions 
are about 10% and 6%, respectively  [ 19 ] . 4 
 Having companies lined up as development partners for such a large proportion 
of university inventions may provide Japan a unique advantage. However, with co-
ownership comes automatic control with no development incentives. Interviews 
with over 20 Japanese companies recently engaged in collaborations with universi-
ties indicate that many collaborative discoveries are not developed, or are not devel-
oped to anywhere near their full potential (Kneller et al. under review  [ 21 ] ). 
 This can be referred to as the “lock up” problem. It is partially alleviated by the fact 
that about half of Japanese joint industry–university patent applications are abandoned 
after 3 years and essentially dedicated to the public (Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science & Technology data compiled by Watanabe  [ 18 ] ). These are consid-
ered to be “defensive” patent applications because they are  fi led mainly to preempt 
 3  This is based on reviewing a random 13% sample (68 patents) of all the approximately 525 US 
patents issued between June 2011 and May 2012, where at least one owner (assignee) is a Japanese 
university. 
 4  The percentage of United States university patents that are co-owned by companies is less than 
5%. However, this is due in part to a unique aspect of United States patent law which permits pat-
ent co-owners to transfer their rights without the permission of other co-owners, thus making co-
ownership of a United States patent equivalent to a transferable, royalty-free, non-exclusive license. 
In all other industrialized countries, the permission of all co-owners is necessary for any license or 
assignment, and thus co-ownership of a non–United States patent is equivalent to a non-transfer-
able, royalty-free, exclusive license  [ 20 ] . 
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rivals from patenting the same discovery and thus to preserve freedom to operate. This 
may increase the patent commons and reduce the patent thicket problem. However, 
the incentives for any company, particularly a startup, to invest substantial resources 
to exploit the full potential of these discoveries are greatly diminished once the dis-
covery is publicized and patent protection is not available. 
 As for the joint research patent applications that are not abandoned, a fraction 5 —
about 175 over a recent 12-month period—issue as United States patents. A review of a 
sample of these jointly owned patents suggests that about half are narrow or cover 
manufacturing processes destined to be used by the sponsoring company. In other words, 
the lock-up danger is low. However, the remainder (currently about 90 United States 
patents issued annually) are broad patents that probably could be useful to several com-
panies or represent potentially signi fi cant technical advances with a potentially signi fi cant 
market impact ( note 3). If the company co-owners of these technologies do not try to 
develop them, or do not at least seriously look into the feasibility of development, this 
would represent a loss of potential future bene fi ts to society and of past taxpayer support 
for the university research that led to these inventions. 6 Presumably, some of the approx-
imately 2,500 joint research inventions that are not abandoned but never issued as United 
States patents are similarly broad. Some companies have revealed that they apply for 
patents on some collaborative university discoveries to deny their use to rivals, even 
though they do not intend to develop the discoveries themselves  [ 18 ] . 
 These indications that lock-up is a signi fi cant problem for joint industry–university 
discoveries re fl ect a more general problem of technology hoarding in large Japanese 
manufacturing companies. In 2007, about 60% of Japanese manufacturing companies 
said that most of their technologies that they do not commercialize themselves are 
simply abandoned and are never made available to outside parties  [ 2 ] . 
 The following account describes one promising technology that would have been 
abandoned had not the company made a dif fi cult, courageous, and probably also 
far-sighted decision to let the inventors and VC investors spin off an independent 
company to develop it. 
 4  Case Example: TeraView 
 TeraView was spun off in 2001 from the Cavendish Laboratory of the University of 
Cambridge’s physics department (CCL) and Toshiba Research Europe (TRE). TRE 
was established in 1991 and its main laboratory was situated near CCL to facilitate 
 5   See note 3. Based upon data in Watanabe  [ 18 ] , this fraction is probably between 5% and 10%. 
 6  Corporate funding for joint research in Japan does not cover the salaries of full-time faculty, nor 
the tuition or stipends of graduate students, and only a fraction of infrastructure costs. It sometimes 
does cover costs of some special equipment and the salaries of a growing number of non-tenured 
so-called “project” assistants, associate and even some full professors. The former are often per-
sons beginning their academic careers. Some of the latter are senior company scientists dispatched 
to the university. In general Japanese companies pay much less per collaborative research project 
than do American companies  [ 6,  19 ] . 
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collaboration between these two laboratories. One of the joint research areas related 
to applications of terahertz frequency light. This revealed potential applications in 
 fi elds such as dentistry, security (detection of weapons or explosives), pharmaceuti-
cal quality control, semiconductor manufacturing quality control, and cosmetics. 
However, Toshiba assessed that none of these applications were related to its core 
business and none would earn suf fi ciently large revenues to justify its moving into 
new development and business areas. Normally it would have abandoned the tech-
nology. However, two of the Cambridge scientists wanted to spin the terahertz tech-
nology off as a new company and one was eager to take on the responsibilities of an 
entrepreneurial company president. 
 TRE supported this plan in principle, reasoning that otherwise the technology would 
die (or at least not be developed for many more years). If TeraView became successful, 
Toshiba would bene fi t as a major stockholder. Also, it was not unreasonable to believe 
that there might be some synergies between Toshiba’s and TeraView’s operations and 
that some of the technologies TeraView might pioneer would be useful for Toshiba—
and that TeraView would turn to Toshiba for some of its equipment needs. 
 However, two issues that needed to be overcome were the longstanding principle 
among Japanese electronics companies that they not out-license exclusive rights to 
their IP (in this case, IP that had arisen from joint research with CCL) and also their 
longstanding practice of sharing among each other non-exclusive rights to some of 
their IP. In other words, Toshiba had to consider not only its own IP strategy, but 
also the expectations of other Japanese electronics companies. On the other side, the 
VC investors, whom TRE and the entrepreneurial CCL scientists had lined up, 
refused to invest if TeraView did not have exclusive rights to the patents covering its 
core technology. After an extended process, exclusive IP rights were granted and 
TeraView was established. 
 Today, most of its main projects are still in development phase and expenses still 
exceed revenues. However, employment has been growing and private investors have 
enough con fi dence in the company to provide it additional rounds of funding. Toshiba 
considers that the most important factor in overcoming the above-mentioned hurdles 
was the competence and enthusiasm of the Cambridge researchers who wanted to 
establish TeraView, particularly Donald Arnone, who is its CEO/President, and Dr. 
Michael Pepper, Director of CCL and founder of TeraView. 
 5  Lessons from TeraView 
 A recent Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry study noted the small number of 
successful spin-offs from Japanese manufacturers and lack of support systems 
within such companies for entrepreneurial activity and spin-offs  [ 2 ] . It also noted 
that Japanese managers tend to be risk averse. It advocated a low-risk low-return 
approach where spin-offs would not be independent from their parents and would 
continue to receive from them various forms of support  [ 2 ] . These semi-independent 
spin-offs, where the parent retains control of key management decisions and which 
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receive some  fi nancial, managerial, or marketing support from the parent are henceforth 
called “tethered” spin-offs. 
 However, the likelihood is probably small that this strategy will result in many 
companies that will develop innovative technologies and be successful in global 
markets. If manufacturers maintain control over their spin-offs (including their IP) 
this would almost certainly drive away potential overseas investors. As overseas 
investors are one of the main sources of networking with overseas customers, alli-
ance partners and other investors, this would make overseas growth harder. Even 
Japanese VC investors would not like being in the position of passive investors. 
While the parent may regard forming a tethered spin-off as an opportunity for risk 
sharing, Japanese VC investors would be hesitant to share substantial risks under 
such circumstances, and they would be unlikely to invest in a novel technology such 
as terahertz. Furthermore, case study analyses from both the United States  [ 22,  23 ] 
and Japan  [ 6 ] suggest that spin-offs that are controlled by their parents usually 
fail—unless, as in the case of Fanuc spinning off from Fujitsu, the spin-off’s opera-
tions already have substantial sales at the time of formation. The most common 
reason is that continuing control by the parent over management decisions usually 
vitiates the advantages of nimbleness and ability to seek freely funding and custom-
ers that are vital to the success of most startups. 
 With these barriers to tethered spin-offs in mind, the TeraView model of creating 
a truly independent VC-backed spin-off might be the most practical way to develop 
the large number of dormant inventions that are not being developed by large com-
panies. It might also be the most likely way the parent will bene fi t from its dormant 
technologies—technologies that probably would otherwise die or languish undevel-
oped for many years. 
 Even though the spin-off would be independent, the parent would probably 
bene fi t from its success in several ways. First, the parent would likely hold 20% or 
more of the spin-off’s stock in return for having licensed to it the core IP and pos-
sibly also having made cash investments  [ 23 ] . The parent may have a seat on the 
board of the directors. Even if it did not, the parent would be able to keep track of 
its R&D progress. The spin-off would likely turn to the parent, when possible, for 
equipment and services. At least in the case of large American IT companies, such 
as IBM, Intel, Cisco, and Qualcomm, spin-offs and other startups have often come 
to supply the parent with technologies it needs  [ 8,  16 ] . The VC investors probably 
would insist on the right to sell the startup or to take the startup public through an 
initial public offering of its stock. However, the parent may have the right to buy the 
spinoff at a set period of time (e.g., 3 years) following its formation. If the parent 
seconded some of its researchers to the startup, the parent’s in fl uence would increase 
and the spin-off might come to resemble a joint venture between the parent and the 
VC investors. In the process, the parent would gain valuable entrepreneurial 
experience. 
 The founders would very likely come from universities and managers would be 
recruited by VC investors. This would avoid the problem noted in the METI study 
that company employees often perceive the risks associated with leaving the 
mother company are too high  [ 2 ] . In general, VC investors would consider  investing 
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in a spin-off to be less risky than investing in startups based only on independent 
university research, provided the parent company had done its own evaluation of 
the university discovery, and especially if it had carried out development work and 
moved the discoveries closer to proof of concept. 
 In any case, the initiative for starting a spin-off may have to come from univer-
sity researchers who understand the technology, know that the company is not 
developing it, and know whom to approach in the company. If the company is inter-
ested in exploring the possibility, the university or the university inventors may 
have to take the lead in contacting VC investors. From this point on, the structure of 
the agreement spinning off the company will probably have to be worked out by the 
parent, VC investors, and founders, with the university playing a facilitating role. 
The prospective parent company should always have the right to say it does not 
want to go through with a spin-off. 
 However, to preserve the parent’s option of forming a spin-off, universities ought 
to require that any sublicenses (even of only non-exclusive rights) of jointly owned 
inventions be made only with the universities’ prior approval. As joint owners, uni-
versities have this right under Article 73 of Japan’s Patent Law (note 4). They ought 
not to give up it up. Universities should permit the collaborating company to grant 
non-exclusive sublicenses only if there are clear public policy reasons to do so, and 
they ought not to permit such sublicenses if it appears that the company probably 
will not develop the discovery, but that some other company (especially a startup) 
might be able to do so. 
 6  Conclusion 
 The story of TeraView is consistent with Christiansen’s accounts  [ 4,  5 ] of how large 
companies often fail to develop new technologies. This comes about because com-
panies do not perceive their value, think the market is too small, consider the tech-
nologies to be too removed from their main business or main customer needs, or 
simply are too bureaucratic to develop them rapidly. The unusual aspect of the 
TeraView case is that Toshiba agreed to let TeraView have exclusive rights to the 
startup’s core IP. This provides a model for how more Japanese spin-offs can grow 
successfully. 
 This chapter noted the dearth of promising Japanese startups outside of biomedi-
cine and the many barriers facing spin-offs and other startups in Japan. Considering 
these dif fi culties, Japan could basically give up on startups and concentrate on 
improving relations between universities and established companies, hoping that 
the established companies will turn themselves around and produce market 
 breakthroughs with a series of fundamentally new technologies. However, recent 
trends, the evidence of hoarding of dormant technologies by manufacturing compa-
nies and their frequent reluctance to enter new technical  fi elds, plus the analyses of 
Christensen and Henderson cited above, all suggest this will not come to pass. 
Moreover, as countries such as China increase their ability to produce high quality 
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manufactured products at a substantially lower price than Japanese manufacturers, 
Japanese industry as a whole risks being trapped between these technically advanc-
ing lower-cost manufacturers and overseas companies that can stay ahead by devel-
oping breakthrough innovations. 
 Particularly with respect to the development of university discoveries where 
startups are proven to be more successful than established companies, Japan needs 
to foster the growth of more science-based startups. Mobilizing some of the many 
dormant but promising university discoveries arising under joint research by spin-
ning off independent companies and letting VCs and entrepreneurs undertake the 
risk of development is one of the best ways to tackle this problem. 
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